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How do neighbors influence investment in 
social capital? : Homeownership and length 
of residence.  
 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores how the circumstances of where a person resides is related 
to the degree of their investment in social capital using individual data from Japan. 
Controlling for unobserved area-specific fixed effects and various individual 
characteristics, I found; (1) Not only that homeownership and length of residence are 
positively related to  investment in social capital, but also that rates of homeowners 
and long-time residents in a locality increase in individual‟s investments in social 
capital. (2) The effects of local neighborhood homeownership and local length of 
residence are distinctly larger than that of an individual‟s.  
 
 
Keywords:  Social Capital, homeownership, length of residence.  
JEL classification: D71, R11, R23. 
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1. Introduction 
Researchers in the field of regional studies have recently drawn attention to the 
issue of social capital (e.g., Glaeser and Redlick 2008; Kilkenny 2006; Westlund 2007). 
Based on standard economic theory, social capital formation can be analyzed using 
an investment model where the amount of social capital depends on an individual‟s 
decision regarding investment (Glaeser et al. 2002). By considering the spatial 
dimension, empirical works have attempted to investigate how social capital is 
accumulated based on individual decision making; suggesting homeowners are more 
likely to invest in social capital as a result of their lower mobility rates (DiPasquale 
and Glaeser 1999; Hilber 2007). On the other hand, evidence has been presented that 
household social ties with neighbors, which can be regarded as a kind of social 
capital, generate benefits for residents1. This benefit disappears if a household moves, 
reinforcing low residential mobility (Kan 2007). This indicates that individual 
decision making is influenced by the degree of accumulated social capital among 
neighbors. It follows from arguments such as those above that under circumstances 
where a larger amount of social capital is formed, a person is less likely to move and 
hence is more inclined to invest in social capital.  
 Not only an individual‟s features but also neighbor characteristics are expected 
to have a critical effect on individual behavior concerning individual investment in 
social capital2. Few researchers, with the exception of DiPasquale and Glaeser 
(DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999), attempt to investigate the effects of homeownership 
and the length of residence on individual investment in social capital. Furthermore, 
although investment in social capital appears affected by socio-economic conditions, 
investigations have not been conducted outside of western countries. How social 
capital is accumulated in countries outside the west needs to be investigated to 
determine the extent to which socio-economic conditions influence results. This 
paper uses individual level data from Japan to investigate not only the effects of 
individual homeownership and the length of residence, but also those of neighbors, 
and then compares the former with the latter.  
The organization of the remainder of this paper is as follows: In section 2, data, 
method of analysis and estimation strategies are described. The results of the 
estimations and their interpretation are provided in section 3. The final section offers 
                                                   
1 Social network considered as social capital appears to make a contribution to 
technological diffusion among colleagues (Yamamura 2008a). 
2 It is found that people are less inclined to cooperate to resolve collective problems 
in more heterogeneous communities (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000; Yamamura 2008b). 
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concluding remarks. 
 
2. Data and Methods 
2.1. Data 
This paper used individual level data containing information related to areas 
such as social capital index, years of living at the current address, homeownership, 
demographic (age and sex) and economic (occupation, household income) status3. 
This data was constructed from the Social Policy and Social Consciousness (SPSC) 
survey conducted in all parts of Japan in 2000. Five thousand adults (aged 20 years 
old or older) were invited to participate in a survey that utilized stratified two-stage 
random sampling. The survey eventually collected data on 3991 adults, a response 
rate of 79.8 %4. Sample points were divided into 11 areas. In each area, according to 
their population size, cities and towns are divided into 4 groups such as the 13 
metropolitan cities, cities with 200 000 people or greater, cities with 100 000 people 
or greater, and towns and villages. Therefore, 4 population groups exist within each 
of the 11 areas. Hence, area-population groups can be divided into 44, which are 
defined as local groups in this paper. As shown later, variables to capture neighbor 
characteristics are calculated in accord with these local groupings.5. 
Table 1 includes variable definitions, means and standard deviations. Following 
the discussion in Putnam (2000), the degree of civic engagement is considered as 
investment for social capital in this research. Thus, social capital was measured 
using the question “Are you actively involved in the activity of a neighborhood 
association?” Responses ran from 0 (not at all) to 3 ( Yes, actively involved ). 
Homeowner was measured using the question “What is your type of residence?”. The 
responses were “I own my home”, “I reside in a home owned by a parent” and “others”. 
For the basic estimation, I defined homeownership as being a home owned by 
individuals or their parents.  
 
2.2. Econometric Framework and Estimation Strategy 
                                                   
3 The data for this secondary analysis, "Social Policy and Social Consciousness 
survey (SPSC), Shogo Takekawa," was provided by the Social Science Japan Data 
Archive, Information Center for Social Science Research on Japan, Institute of Social 
Science, The University of Tokyo. 
4 Respondents did not respond to all questions and therefore 3075samples were used 
for regression estimations. 
5 According to the data used in this research, 4 areas do not contain metropolitan 
cities. Thus, only 40 local groups exist in the data. 
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I see from Table 2 (1) that a homeowner is significantly more likely to invest in 
social capital. Table 2 (2) shows that a person living at their current address longer 
than 20 years is more inclined to invest in social capital. These results are in line 
with the evidence provided by earlier report that barriers to mobility give individuals 
an incentive to investment in social capital (DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999; Hilber 
2007).    
I now explore how the local circumstance of individuals, captured by neighbor 
homeownership and length of residence, are related to an individuals‟ investment in 
social capital. Following the model used by DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999), the 
estimated function takes the following form: 
SC im= 0  + 1 HOME im+ 2LIVE20im +3LIVE10im +4AVHOMEim 
+5AVLIVE20im +   
6AVLIVE10im+7CHILDim+8MARRIim+9DIVm+9AGEim+9INCOMEim
+ 
9UNIVim+9MALEim+em+ uim , 
where SC im represents the dependent variable in resident i, and area m. ‟s 
represents regression parameters. em represents unobservable area specific effects 
that are controlled by dummy variables. uim represents the error term. In addition to 
the OLS model, the Ordered Probit model is also employed since the dependent 
variable is qualitative and ranges from 0 to 3. 
Individual homeownership dummy, HOME, is used to capture the homeowner 
effect. If a homeowner tends to invest in social capital, the anticipated sign of HOME 
is positive. As discussed by DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999), HOME is possibly 
correlated with unmeasured factors included in uim. HOME is thus thought to be an 
endogenous variable, resulting in estimation bias6. A person residing in a home 
owned by a parent is less likely to suffer endogenous bias since it is exogenously 
determined whether a parent is a homeowner or not. Therefore, I omit the samples 
where an individual is the homeowner and newly define the dummy variable, which 
takes 1 if one‟s parent is the homeowner, otherwise 0, as HOME, to conduct 
alternative estimations aiming to alleviate endogenous bias7. To capture the effect of 
                                                   
6 DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) considered the average group homeownership rate 
as an exogenous variable and used it as an instrument variable. Similar results are 
obtained if the same estimation method is employed using the data used for this 
research, although estimation results are not reported. I regard such a group average 
variable as more useful for capturing the neighborhood effect as an independent 
variable. 
7 Sample size is 3075 when all samples are used. Among these, samples are 2349 
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length of residence, individual long resident dummies such as LIVE20 and LIVE 10 
are used. According to Kan (2007), length of residence can be considered as the 
degree of integration into the neighborhood. People integrated into the neighborhood 
are thought to be inclined to invest in social capital since the return from the 
investment is expected to be large. Hence, coefficients of LIVE20 and LIVE10 are 
predicted to take the positive signs. What is more, longer time residents are more 
inclined to invest in social capital so that the magnitude of LIVE20 is anticipated to 
be larger than LIVE10.  
The rate of neighborhood homeownership can be regarded as the degree of local 
population immobility, since homeownership creates a barrier to mobility. As a 
consequence, homeowners have a tendency to invest in social capital (DiPasquale 
and Glaeser 1999). By definition, the rate of long-time residence is also thought to 
reflect local population immobility. Long-time residents are likely to have long-term 
relationships with neighbors since people will move if they fail to construct good 
relationships with their neighbors8. Hence, neighborhood homeownership and length 
of residence are thought to be proxies for accumulated social capital. Neighborhood 
homeownership and length of residence are measured by group average HOME rate 
(AVHOME) and group average LIVE20 and LIVE10 rates (AVLIVE20 and 
AVLIVE10) within a local group, respectively. To exclude an individual i‟ s effect from 
i‟ s local group average, i‟ s sample is omitted from the samples when local average 
values are calculated. These variables would take positive signs if ample social 
capital within a community where a person resides encourages a person to invest in 
social capital. 
People with children are likely to have opportunities to interact with other 
parents through PTA meetings and various events for children held by community 
associations, leading the sign for CHILD to become positive. Several control 
variables are also included to capture individual characteristics: marital status, age, 
male‟s dummy, and university graduation dummy. 
 
                                                                                                                                                
when HOME takes 1. So, the homeownership rate is 76% in all samples. More 
precisely, 2349 homeownerships are made up of 1878 individual homeownerships 
and 471 of parent ownership. Therefore, the sample size used in the alternative 
estimations becomes 1197 since the individual homeownership samples are omitted. 
In this case, the parent homeownership rate becomes 39%. 
8 People would suffer from ostracism if they infringe social norms considered as local 
rules, leading to people following norms (Hayami 2001). Such a „community 
mechanism‟ seems to be, to a certain extent, effective even in modern Japanese 
society (Yamamura 2008c). 
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3. Estimation Results and their Interpretation 
Tables 3 and A1 presented in the Appendix report results using all samples.  
Alternative estimation results are presented in Tables 4 and A2, where I omit 
samples where a person is the homeowner and use the dummy variable, which takes 
1 if a parent is the homeowner, otherwise it takes 0, as HOME. If homeownership 
creates a barrier to mobility, the length of residence is correlated with 
homeownership, resulting in multicollinearlity. Therefore, in Tables 3, 4, A1, and A2, 
column (3) reports results when AVLIVE20 and AVLIVE10 are excluded, and column 
(4) results when AVHOME is excluded to compare the full model in column(2) with 
columns(3) and (4). 
I now discuss Table 3 that shows the results of OLS estimations. Looking at the 
first row shows that HOME has positive signs in all estimations, and is statistically 
significant at the 1 % level.  This implies that a homeowner is more likely to invest 
in social capital, which is consistent with DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999). As 
anticipated, LIVE20 and LIVE10 yield positive signs in all estimations although 
LIVE10 is not statistically significant. As anticipated, the magnitude of LIVE20 is 
obviously larger than that of LIVE10. It follows from this that a barrier to mobility 
caused by individual characteristics enhances social capital investment. With respect 
to neighbor effects captured by AVHOME, AVLIVE20, and AVLIVE10, AVHOME 
produces significant positive signs in columns (2) and (3). It is also interesting to 
observe that the values of AVHOME are about 4 times larger than those of HOME, 
which implies that neighbor homeownership makes a greater contribution to 
increases in social capital formation than does individual homeownership.  
AVLIVE20 and AVLIVE10 show positive signs, despite being statistically 
insignificant in column (2). If AVHOME is excluded, as exhibited in column (4), both 
continue to yield positive signs and AVLIVE20 becomes statistically significant at 
the 1 % level. Consistent with the prediction, AVLIVE20 is larger than ALIVE10. 
What is more, values of AVLIVE20 and AVLIVE10 are clearly larger than LIVE20 
and LIVE10. Therefore, the neighbor length of residence effect is thought to be larger 
than the individual‟s length of residence effect. CHILD shows the anticipated 
positive sign and is statistically significant at the 1 % level, suggesting parents are 
more likely to being integrated into the community, such as through involvement 
with the PTA. Most of the results concerning other variables, with the exception of 
UNIV which takes negative signs, are consistent with existing work (DiPasquale and 
Glaeser 1999). 
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 I now turn to the results of Table 4 where samples are restricted. I concentrate 
attention on homeownership and length of residence. In all estimations, HOME and 
LIVE20 continue to exhibit significant positive signs although LIVE10 becomes 
negative.  When I compare these with the full sample estimations seen in Table 3, 
the values of HOME are slightly over 0.20 and are almost at the same level as 
HOME shown in Table 3. Those of LIVE20 are 0.12, larger than those of LIVE20 in 
Table 3. Overall, the results of individual homeownership and length of residence are 
robust when the endogenous bias of HOME is controlled for. As for AVHOME, it 
produces the expected positive signs and is statistically significant at the 1 % level. 
Values of AVHOME are approximately 1, almost the same as those of AVHOME in 
Table 3. Both ALIVE20 and ALIVE10 take positive signs and ALIVE20 in column (4) 
is statistically significant at the 1 % level. Compared with the full sample 
estimations in Table 3, values of AVLIVE 20 are almost the same as in Table 3, while 
values of AVLIVE10 show 0.60, larger than ALIVE10 in Table 3. Considering what 
has been observed overall in Tables 3 and , the effects of neighbor homeownership 
and length of residence are distinctly larger than those of an individual‟s 
homeownership effects, and continue to be held after alleviating the endogenous bias 
of individual homeownership. I can derive the argument from this that individuals 
are inclined to invest in social capital under circumstances where their community is 
a tightly knitted one based on long-term social ties with neighbors. In other words, a 
large amount of accumulated social capital enhances an individual‟s investment in 
social capital. The evidence from the U.S. provided by DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) 
did not find that the local homeownership rate significantly affects social capital 
investment, while their model predicts that local homeownership rates will affect 
investment in social capital. Thus the evidence from the U.S is contrary to that from 
Japan provided by this research. One reason why the neighbor effect is different 
between U.S. and Japan might be that U.S is racially more heterogeneous and so the 
neighborhood effect is decreased.  
As shown in the APPENDIX, the results of Ordered Probit estimations shown in 
Tables A1 and A2 correspond to those of the OLS estimations in Tables 3 and 4, 
respectively. The results obtained by Ordered Probit estimations are similar to the 
OLS estimations, implying that the results of OLS are robust to alternative 
estimations and therefore strongly support the argument noted above. 
 
4. Conclusions 
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How and the extent to which the incentive to invest in social capital increases 
when individuals own their home has been well investigated. However, little is 
known about the effects of a neighbor‟s homeownership on individual investment in 
social capital. This paper aims to explore how the circumstances of where a person 
resides are related to the degree of their own investment in social capital using data 
of the 3 075 adult participants in the 2000 Social Policy and Social Consciousness 
(SPSC) survey. Controlling for unobserved area-specific fixed effects and various 
individual characteristics, I found;  
(1) Not only that an individual‟s homeownership and length of residence are 
positively related to their investment in social capital, but also that the rates of 
homeownership and long-time residence in a locality increase an individual‟s 
investments in social capital.  
(2) The effect of local neighbor homeownership and length of residence are 
remarkably larger than that of an individual‟s homeownership.  
Empirical study provided evidence that the effect of a neighborhood‟s immobility 
on social capital formation is larger than those of an individual‟s when a person 
makes a decision regarding investment. What came out most clearly from this 
investigation was that not only an individual„s characteristics but also positive 
externality stemming from neighborhood immobility have crucial roles in social 
capital formation and thus should be considered in any study related to social 
capital.  
The endogenous problem of homeownership appears to cause estimation bias but 
was not sufficiently controlled in this study. Therefore, suitable instruments need to 
be determined and then two-stage estimation conducted.  Further, this study was 
limited to Japan and the findings provided thus far cannot be easily generalized. The 
findings of this study are not fully congruent with the findings from the U.S. 
(DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999). To better verify the generality of the arguments 
presented here, study comparing results from other countries with different 
socio-cultural backgrounds needs to be conducted using larger sample sizes. These 
are issues remaining to be addressed in future studies. 
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Table 1 
Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
 
 
Not
e:  
a 10 
Mil
lion 
yen   
 
 
Variables 
 
Definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
Max Min 
SC The degree of involvement in the activities of a neighborhood 
association runs from 0 (not at all) to 3 (actively involved).  
1.35 0.95 3 0 
HOME 
 
Takes 1 if one is a homeowner, otherwise takes 0. 
 
0.76 0.42 1 0 
LIVE20 Takes 1 if a person has lived at their current address for longer 
than 20 years, otherwise takes 0. 
0.62 0.48 1 0 
LIVE10 Takes 1 if a person has lived at their current address for 
between 10 and 20 years, otherwise takes 0. 
0.17 0.37 1 0 
AVHOME Average value of HOME within an area. (Total HOME in the 
locality minus own HOME)/(Number of samples minus 1) 
0.76 0.11 0.98 0.43 
AVLIVE20 Average value of LIVE20 within an area. (Total LIVE20 in the 
locality minus own LIVE20)/(Number of samples minus 1) 
0.61 0.09 0.89 0.26 
AVLIVE10 Average value of LIVE10 within an area. (Total LIVE10 in the 
locality minus own LIVE10)/(Number of samples minus 1) 
0.17 0.05 0.26 0.04 
CHILD 
 
Takes 1 if a person has child, otherwise takes 0.  0.77 0.41 1 0 
MARRI Takes 1 if one has a spouse, otherwise takes 0. 
 
 0.75  0.43 1 0 
DIV Takes 1 if one experienced divorce, otherwise takes 0. 
 
0.03 0.17 1 0 
AGE Ages 
 
49 15 96 20 
INCOME Household income a 
 
0.65 0.41 0.23 0 
UNIV Takes 1 if one graduated from university, otherwise takes 0.  0.15  0.36 
 
1 0 
MALE Takes 1 if one is male, otherwise takes 0. 
 
0.47 0.49 1 0 
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Table 2  
Social capital and characteristics of residents. 
(1) Comparison of social capital between homeowner and non-homeowner. 
 Homeowner Non-homeowner t-value 
SC 1.46 1.01 12.6 ** 
Note: ** indicates significance at the 1 per cent level. 
 
(2) Comparison of social capital between people living at their current address 
for longer than 20 years and others. 
 Longer than 20 years Others t-value 
SC 1.48 1.15 10.4 ** 
Note: ** indicates significance at the 1 per cent level. 
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Table 3 
Determinants of investment for social capital: All samples (OLS model) 
Variables (1)  (2) (3) (4)  
HOME 
 
0.24** 
(5.91) 
0.19** 
(4.72) 
0.19** 
(4.72) 
0.22** 
(5.39) 
LIVE20 0.17** 
(3.80) 
0.17** 
(3.71) 
0.17** 
(3.77) 
0.16** 
(3.61) 
LIVE10 0.01 
(0.19) 
0.01 
(0.28) 
0.01 
(0.32) 
0.007 
(0.15) 
AVHOME 
 
 0.91** 
(4.44) 
1.01** 
(6.18) 
 
AVLIVE20 
 
 0.28 
(0.93) 
 1.03** 
(3.94) 
AVLIVE10 
 
 0.22 
(0.48) 
 0.33 
(0.70) 
CHILD 
 
0.31** 
(5.69) 
0.30** 
(5.59) 
0.30** 
(5.59) 
0.31** 
(5.66) 
MARRI 0.20** 
(3.69) 
0.19** 
(3.60) 
0.19** 
(3.59) 
0.20** 
(3.72) 
DIV -0.09 
(-0.95) 
-0.08 
(-0.87) 
-0.08 
(-0.89) 
-0.08 
(-0.87) 
AGE 
 
0.007** 
(6.10) 
0.008** 
(6.25) 
0.008** 
(6.27) 
0.007** 
(6.12) 
INCOME 
 
-0.02 
(-0.49) 
-0.01 
(-0.39) 
-0.01 
(-0.41) 
-0.01 
(-0.38) 
UNIV 
 
-0.08* 
(-1.78) 
-0.06 
(-1.42) 
-0.06 
(-1.42) 
-0.07 
(-1.60) 
MALE 
 
-0.01 
(-0.44) 
-0.01 
(-0.57) 
-0.01 
(-0.57) 
-0.01 
(-0.54) 
Area a YES YES YES YES 
Adj R- square 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 
Sample size 3075 3075 3075 3075 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. * and ** indicate significance at 5 
and 1 per cent levels, respectively (one-sided tests). A constant term is included when 
an estimation was conducted but its result is not reported to save space. * and ** 
indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
 a.YES means that dummy variables are included to control for area specific effects. 
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Table 4 
Determinants of investment for social capital: Living in home owned by parents 
(OLS model) 
Variables (1)  (2) (3) (4)  
HOME 
 
0.26** 
(4.24) 
0.21** 
(3.31) 
0.20** 
(3.30) 
0.23** 
(3.81) 
LIVE20 0.12* 
(1.94) 
0.12* 
(1.91) 
0.12* 
(1.94) 
0.12* 
(1.85) 
LIVE10 -0.03 
(-0.46) 
-0.02 
(-0.37) 
-0.02 
(-0.37) 
-0.03 
(-0.43) 
AVHOME 
 
 0.89** 
(2.75) 
0.98** 
(3.68) 
 
AVLIVE20 
 
 0.35 
(0.81) 
 0.97** 
(2.57) 
AVLIVE10 
 
 0.60 
(0.84) 
 0.60 
(0.84) 
CHILD 
 
0.35** 
(4.25) 
0.35** 
(4.21) 
0.35** 
(4.22) 
0.35** 
(4.25) 
MARRI 0.16* 
(1.95) 
0.15* 
(1.84) 
0.15* 
(1.81) 
0.16* 
(1.93) 
DIV -0.009 
(-0.07) 
-0.01 
(-0.09) 
-0.01 
(-0.15) 
-0.003 
(-0.03) 
AGE 
 
0.007** 
(3.35) 
0.006** 
(3.29) 
0.007** 
(3.31) 
0.006** 
(3.28) 
INCOME 
 
-0.06 
(-0.91) 
-0.07 
(-1.01) 
-0.07 
(-1.01) 
-0.06 
(-0.93) 
UNIV 
 
-0.04 
(-0.56) 
-0.02 
(-0.30) 
-0.02 
(-0.30) 
-0.03 
(-0.42) 
MALE 
 
0.004 
(0.08) 
-0.003 
(-0.06) 
-0.002 
(-0.05) 
0.003 
(0.01) 
Area a YES YES YES YES 
Adj R- square 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Sample size 1197 1197 1197 1197 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. * and ** indicate significance at 5 
and 1 per cent levels, respectively (one-sided tests). A constant term is included when 
an estimation was conducted but its result is not reported to save space. * and ** 
indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
 a.YES means that dummy variables are included to control for area specific effects. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1 
Determinants of investment for social capital (Ordered Probit model) 
Variables (1)  (2) (3) (4)  
HOME 
 
0.30** 
(5.89) 
0.24** 
(4.70) 
0.24** 
(4.70) 
0.27** 
(5.37) 
LIVE20 0.21** 
(3.74) 
0.20** 
(3.66) 
0.21** 
(3.71) 
0.20** 
(3.55) 
LIVE10 0.01 
(0.17) 
0.01 
(0.28) 
0.02 
(0.31) 
0.008 
(0.13) 
AVHOME 
 
 1.11** 
(4.41) 
1.24** 
(6.11) 
 
AVLIVE20 
 
 0.35 
(0.91) 
 1.26** 
(3.90) 
AVLIVE10 
 
 0.29 
(0.50) 
 0.41 
(0.73) 
CHILD 
 
0.39** 
(5.74) 
0.38** 
(5.64) 
0.38** 
(5.63) 
0.38** 
(5.71) 
MARRI 0.25** 
(3.76) 
0.24** 
(3.68) 
0.24** 
(3.66) 
0.25** 
(3.80) 
DIV -0.10 
(-0.85) 
-0.09 
(-0.76) 
-0.09 
(-0.78) 
-0.09 
(-0.77) 
AGE 
 
0.009** 
(6.10) 
0.009** 
(6.26) 
0.009** 
(6.28) 
0.009** 
(6.12) 
INCOME 
 
-0.02 
(-0.53) 
-0.02 
(-0.42) 
-0.02 
(-0.44) 
-0.02 
(-0.42) 
UNIV 
 
-0.09* 
(-1.66) 
-0.07 
(-1.31) 
-0.07 
(-1.32) 
-0.08 
(-1.48) 
MALE 
 
-0.01 
(-0.42) 
-0.02 
(-0.55) 
-0.02 
(-0.54) 
-0.02 
(-0.52) 
Area a YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R- square 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 
Sample size 3075 3075 3075 3075 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. * and ** indicate significance at 5 
and 1 per cent levels, respectively (one-sided tests). * and ** indicate significance at 5 
and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
 a.YES means that dummy variables are included to control for area specific effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
APPENDIX 
Table A2  
Determinants of investment for social capital: Living in home owned by parents 
(Ordered Probit model) 
Variables (1)  (2) (3) (4)  
HOME 
 
0.32** 
(4.23) 
0.26** 
(3.30) 
0.26** 
(3.29) 
0.29** 
(3.79) 
LIVE20 0.15* 
(1.86) 
0.15* 
(1.85) 
0.15* 
(1.86) 
0.14* 
(1.78) 
LIVE10 -0.05 
(-0.57) 
-0.04 
(-0.47) 
-0.04 
(-0.46) 
-0.05 
(-0.54) 
AVHOME 
 
 1.11** 
(2.76) 
1.21** 
(3.63) 
 
AVLIVE20 
 
 0.40 
(0.73) 
 1.17** 
(2.47) 
AVLIVE10 
 
 0.72 
(0.80) 
 0.70 
(0.79) 
CHILD 
 
0.44** 
(4.27) 
0.44** 
(4.23) 
0.44** 
(4.24) 
0.44** 
(4.27) 
MARRI 0.20* 
(2.00) 
0.19* 
(1.89) 
0.19* 
(1.85) 
0.20* 
(1.99) 
DIV -0.004 
(-0.03) 
-0.005 
(-0.03) 
-0.01 
(-0.03) 
0.003 
(0.02) 
AGE 
 
0.008** 
(3.29) 
0.008** 
(3.25) 
0.008** 
(3.27) 
0.008** 
(3.22) 
INCOME 
 
-0.09 
(-1.00) 
-0.10 
(-1.08) 
-0.10 
(-1.09) 
-0.09 
(-1.02) 
UNIV 
 
-0.03 
(-0.44) 
-0.01 
(-0.19) 
-0.01 
(-0.20) 
-0.02 
(-0.30) 
MALE 
 
0.01 
(0.21) 
0.004 
(0.07) 
0.005 
(0.08) 
0.008 
(0.13) 
Area a YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R- square 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Sample size 1197 1197 1197 1197 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. * and ** indicate significance at 5 
and 1 per cent levels, respectively (one-sided tests). * and ** indicate significance at 5 
and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
 a.YES means that dummy variables are included to control for area specific effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
